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DEATH BY INCARCERATION AS A CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT WHEN APPLIED TO JUVENILES:
EXTENDING ROPER TO LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE,
OUR OTHER DEATH PENALTY
ROBERT JOHNSON, PH.D.*
AND SONIA TABRIZ**
I. INTRODUCTION
In Roper v. Simmons,' the United States Supreme Court held
that juveniles 2 could not be subjected to the death penalty. 3 The Court
emphasized that the well-documented immaturity of juveniles makes
them less culpable for their crimes and less easily deterred by the
threat of punishment.4 The Court also stressed the unformed characters
of juveniles, which raised the possibility of reform and even
forgiveness for their crimeS-neither reform nor forgiveness is
possible with a final and irrevocable punishment such as execution,
because ending a juvenile's life prevents him from attaining "a mature
understanding of his own humanity." 6 Finally, the Court emphasized
"evolving standards of decency" as evidenced by a number of state
legislatures prohibiting the execution of juveniles and the increasingly
rare execution of juveniles in states where capital sentences are
permissible.7 For these reasons, the Court held that death by execution,
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1. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
2. Juveniles are offenders who committed their crimes before turning eighteen. See id
at 574-75.
3. Id. at 568.
4. Id. at 569-71.
5. Id. at 570.
6. Id. at 574. The Court emphasizes that "there are two distinct social purposes served
by the death penalty: 'retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders."'
Id. at 571. As noted, these apply to juveniles with "lesser force" due to their "diminished
culpability." Id. at 572. Significantly, while the Court does not categorize reform or
forgiveness as formal penological objectives, it is implied that, in principle, they are possible
with any punishment that offers a chance for the person to attain a "mature understanding of
his own humanity," which requires at least the prospect of reentry into the free society. Id. at
574. See also ROBERT JOHNSON, HARD TIME: UNDERSTANDING AND REFORMING THE PRISON
314-321 (3rd ed. 2002).
7. Roper, 543 U.S. at 567. ("As in Atkins, the objective indicia of consensus in this
case-the rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of States; the infrequency of
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when applied to juveniles, is cruel and unusual punishment and
violates the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.8
In this article, we maintain that the Eighth Amendment also
prohibits sentencing juveniles to life without parole because this
sanction is a death sentence in its own right. A sentence of life without
parole amounts to "death by incarceration" 9 since offenders are
sentenced to die in prison, making this sanction "our other death
penalty."' 0 Our justice system should not subject juveniles to death by
incarceration for the same reasons that the Court in Roper prohibited
the use of death by execution with juveniles. It is well established and
accepted by the Court that, as a class, juveniles are inherently
immature, impulsive, and vulnerable to social pressure." Their
characters are not fully formed, and hence the Court in Roper viewed
them as capable of change, and deserving of the opportunity to
change.12  These inherent attributes of adolescents reduce the
culpability of juveniles and their susceptibility to deterrence,' 3 making
a final and irrevocable sanction like death by incarceration
fundamentally inappropriate.
Moreover, death by -incarceration, like death by execution,
denies juveniles the opportunity to mature and earn forgiveness for
their transgressions. The Court in Roper held that juvenile offenders
are inherently immature and irresponsible, but they often outgrow
these characteristics in adulthood under normal social conditions.
14
its use even where it remains on the books; and the consistency in the trend toward abolition
of the practice-provide sufficient evidence that today our society views juveniles, in the
words Atkins used respecting the mentally retarded, as "categorically less culpable than the
average criminal."). See also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 856 (1988) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("Because the death penalty is the most severe punishment, the Eighth
Amendment applies to it with special force.").
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See also Roper, 543 U.S. at 560, 568.
9. Accordingly, we use interchangeably the terms "death by incarceration," "life
without parole" (abbreviated as "LWOP"), and "our other death penalty." More often than not,
we use the term death by incarceration to emphasize that it is death-whether by execution or
incarceration-that is the intended result of America's two death penalties. Also, we use the
term "lifer" to refer to offenders serving a life-without-parole sentence.
10. Robert Johnson & Sandra McGunigall-Smith, Life Without Parole, America's Other
Death Penalty: Notes on Life Under Sentence of Death by Incarceration, 88 THE PRISON J. 328
(2008), available at http://tpj.sagepub.comlcgilreprint/8812/328.pdf. See also EQUAL JUSTICE
INITIATIVE, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: SENTENCING 13- AND 14- YEAR-OLD CHILDREN TO DIE IN
PRISON 4 (2008).
11. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-71.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See id. at 570 ("[t]he relevance of youth as a mitigating factor derives from the fact
that the signature qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness
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However, prisons do not promote-and rarely even permit-this
positive growth and maturation. Prisons are, by definition, settings of
punishment, not forgiveness.' 5 A lifetime of prison, in other words,
amounts to a lifetime of adolescent immaturity in a setting expressly
designed to inflict punishment.
Finally, death by incarceration is the most common sentence
imposed on adult capital murderers, since juries tend to select life
without parole over death by execution. 16 The rate at which juries
select death sentences (death by execution) has dropped dramatically
and recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside" (quoting Johnson v. Texas,
509 U.S. 350, 368 (1992))). See also id. ("For most teens, [risky or antisocial] behaviors are
fleeting; they cease with maturity as individual identity becomes settled. Only a relatively
small proportion of adolescents who experiment in risky or illegal activities develop
entrenched patterns of problem behavior that persist into adulthood" (quoting Elizabeth S.
Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental
Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003))).
15. The modem prison is devoted to "warehousing, punishment, and retribution." See H.
BRUCE FRANKLIN, PRISON WRITING IN THE 20TH CENTURY 338 (Penguin, 1998). See also
ROBERT JOHNSON, HARD TIME: UNDERSTANDING AND REFORMING THE PRISON 3 (3rd ed. 2002);
ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, 208-11 (2008).
16. See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY
(September 17, 2009), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf. See also
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, DEATH PENALTY TRENDS (Aug. 2009), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/factsheets/DeathPenaltyFacts.pdf. See also AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL USA, EXECUTIONS BY STATE IN THE U.S. (Sept. 22, 2009), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/death-penalty/death-penalty-facts/executions-by-
state/page.do?id=1011590. It is revealing that the State of Texas, which until recently did not
allow capital juries to consider LWOP as an alternative to death by execution, has had far and
away the highest rate of capital sentences and executions in the nation. Id. Uniformly, states
that offered LWOP as a sentencing option have dramatically lower rates of capital sentences
and executions. Id. See also Paul Purpura, Surge in Death Penalty Prosecutions Slows in
Jefferson Parish, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jul. 6, 2009, available at
http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2009/07/surge-in-capitalcases-slows-i.html. In the
words of Denny Leboeuf of New Orleans, director of the ACLU's John Adams Project,
"Executions are down, death sentences are down, capital prosecutions are down..." See also
Interview with Harun Shabazz, Death Penalty Defense Unit, Office of the Maryland State
Public Defender's Office (Jun. 17, 2009) ("since the LWOP sentencing option was introduced
in Maryland in 1987, jurors are more likely to give a non-death sentence in a capital case.
Moreover, prosecutors are more likely to enter a plea agreement in which the death notice is
dropped. For instance, in Baltimore County, cases litigated under the old rules (with no LWOP
sentencing option) resulted in a 44% death sentence rate. Subsequently, cases litigated under
the new rule (with the LWOP sentencing option) resulted in a 19% death sentence rate.").
Thus, the experience in Maryland is that the rate of death sentences has dropped substantially
since the introduction of life without parole as an option. See also DEATH PENALTY
INFORMATION CENTER, STUDIES: OHIO PROSECUTORS INCREASINGLY SEEKING LIFE WITHOUT
PAROLE INSTEAD OF DEATH PENALTY (citing A. Welsh-Huggins, Ohio Prosecutors Using New
Life Without Parole Option, AKRON BEACON J., Jun. 22, 2008) ("there has been a sharp drop in
the use of the death penalty in Ohio as prosecutors are taking advantage of a new law allowing
them to seek a sentence of life without parole without first pursuing the death penalty").
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while the popularity of death by incarceration has grown.17 This trend
reaffirms the role of death by incarceration as our "other death
penalty." As such, death by incarceration should be excluded from use
with juvenile offenders. Following the logic of Roper, lifetime
incarceration is too severe a sanction for a juvenile offender who is
less culpable than an adult offender and possesses an inherent ability
to change under suitable conditions. We contend that a life sentence
with the possibility of parole should constitute the most extreme
sanction permissible for juvenile offenders. This sentence leaves open
the opportunity for personal change, forgiveness, and ultimately, a
chance at life in free society.
II. THE ESSENTIAL GOALS OF PUNISHMENT, RETRIBUTION AND
DETERRENCE, CANNOT BE ACHIEVED BY DEATH BY INCARCERATION
WHEN APPLIED TO JUVENILE OFFENDERS
Roper barred the execution of juveniles, in part, because
juveniles as a class are inherently immature, impulsive, short-sighted,
and vulnerable to social pressure.' 8 Moreover, their characters are not
fully formed. 19 In other words, juveniles are immature through no fault
of their own; their personalities are works in progress. By clear
implication, juveniles can change and hence might one day earn
forgiveness for their transgressions. As a result of these attributes, the
Court in Roper determined that the two main purposes of punishment,
retribution and deterrence, cannot be successfully achieved when the
death penalty (death by execution) is applied to juveniles. 2 1 Juveniles
should not be subjected to final and irrevocable sanctions like the
death penalty as a proportionate punishment for even the worst
crimes.T The death sentence will not effectively deter juveniles since
they lack self-control.
17. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, DEATH PENALTY TRENDS (Aug. 2009),
http://www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/factsheets/DeathPenaltyFacts.pdf.
18. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 ("[J]uveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.").
19. Id. at 569-7 1.
20. See Andrew Von Hirsch, Proportionate Sentences for Juveniles: How Different
Than Adults? 3 PUNSHMENT AND SOC'Y 221, 223 (2001).
21. Roper, 543 U.S. at 574.
22. See ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE
131-39 (2008). By contrast, an adult who is merely immature is fully culpable for his actions.
The immaturity of adult offenders is seen as an aggravating condition, adding to the likelihood
of severe punishment.
244
JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE
We suggest that retribution and deterrence cannot be achieved
by sentencing juveniles to death by incarceration, our other death
penalty. Offenders sentenced to death by incarceration experience a
civil death. By "civil death" we mean that "their freedom-the
essential feature of our civil society-has come to a permanent end.",
23
Therefore, in the same way that the final and irrevocable nature of
death by execution makes it an ill-suited and disproportionate
punishment for juvenile offenders, the final and irrevocable nature of
death by incarceration is too severe a sanction for juveniles as well.
The sentence of death by incarceration is explicitly designed to
bring finality to life sentences by precluding the possibility of parole.24
Under the sentence of death by incarceration, it can be said as a matter
of law that "life means life" because these prisoners are slated to spend
the remainder of their natural lives behind bars, gaining release only
upon their deaths. 25 This sentence, like a death sentence, is final and
absolute by its very terms. And while it is true that any sentence can be
changed while the prisoner is alive, the fact that sentences of death by
incarceration can, in theory, be changed during the life of the prisoner
may lead some to infer that this sanction is not, in practice, final and
irrevocable. But as we have noted, sentences of death by execution
also can be changed during the life of the condemned prisoner, a life
that can extend for many years (over twenty years on some death
rows) .26
In fact, sentences of death by execution are changed often,
because these sentences are frequently the subject of successful
litigation. Some litigation, for example, has given rise to decisions that
23. Johnson, supra note 10, at 328-29 (2008).
24. ASHLEY NELLIS & RYAN KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, No EXIT: THE
ExPANDING USE OF LIFE SENTENCES IN AMERICA 1, 4 (2009), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_noexit.pdf ("Even though life
sentences [h]ave existed for a long time, historically they were generally indeterminate, with
the possibility of parole to serve as an incentive for behavioral modifications and
improvements ... The expansion of LWOP sentencing in particular was intended to ensure
that 'life means life."').
25. See SCOTT E. SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE DEATH
PENALTY 37 (2005). Even so, prosecutors may try to raise doubts about whether life without
parole really means that the prisoner is locked up for his life. Unless such doubts are directly
addressed by the defense, there may be a tendency for jurors to doubt the finality of this
sanction since, in principle, any sanction, including death by execution, can be changed at
some point in the future. Similarly, some jurors are inclined to doubt the finality of death by
execution because they doubt the finality of all sentences.
26. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, TIME ON DEATH Row,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/time-death-row (last visited Dec. 27, 2009) ("Death row
inmates in the U.S. typically spend over a decade awaiting execution. Some prisoners have
been on death row for well over 20 years.").
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emptied existing death rows27 or removed certain classes of people
28from the purview of death by execution. These various cases resulted
in the release of thousands of formerly condemned prisoners into the
general prison population with life or life without parole sentences.29
Moreover, beyond the sweeping effects of changes in case law,
sentences of death by execution are regularly overturned on an
individual basis. Research reveals that as many as sixty percent of
capital sentences are reversed on appeal, leading to sentences of life
without parole (death by incarceration), life with parole, and, in some
cases, to lesser, negotiated sentences or even acquittal. 30 There is no
comparable body of cases that applies to sentences of death by
incarceration, and existing evidence suggests that these sentences are
rarely voided or changed for any reason. 1 Thus, in practice, death by
incarceration may well be more final and irrevocable than sentences of
32death by execution.
Offenders sentenced to death by incarceration, like prisoners
condemned to death by execution, experience a final and irrevocable
sentence that culminates in deaths that are untimely and undignified.33
Long-term prisoners, and especially those serving terms of life without
27. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See also Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976).
28. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (exempting the insane from the
execution-eligible population). See also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (exempting
rapists); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (exempting the mentally retarded); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (exempting juveniles).
29. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2007 - STATISTICAL TABLES (2007),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/html/cp/2007/tables/cpO7stlO.htm. Of the 7,547 persons
sentenced to death between 1977 and 2007, 3,228 (or 42.8%) have been removed from death
row primarily because of successful appeals. Id. See generally JOAN M. CHEEVER, BACK FROM
THE DEAD: ONE WOMAN'S SEARCH FOR THE MEN WHO WALKED OFF AMERICA'S DEATH Row
(2006).
30. See James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagen & Valerie West, A Broken System: Error
Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, ii-iii (2000), available at
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/instructionalservices/liebman/liebman-final.pdf.
31. See SUNDBY, supra note 25, at 38 ("[S]ince 1978 in California, no one has ever had a
life sentence commuted to a lesser sentence.").
32. See Paul Purpura, Surge in Death Penalty Prosecutions Slows in Jefferson Parish,
THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jul. 6, 2009, available at
http://www.nola.comf/news/index.ssf/2009/07/surgein-capital-cases-slowsi.html. The drop
in death sentences, in the words of Jelpi Picou, executive director of the Capital Appeals
Project in New Orleans, "reflects the emerging view that life without parole is an incredibly
serious punishment and that juries, prosecutors, the public and family members of victims are
increasingly preferring the certainty of [this] sentence over the confusions, delays, multiple
retrials and high error rates that are inherent in capital cases." Id.
33. See ROBERT JOHNSON, DEATH WORK: A STUDY OF THE MODERN EXECUTION PROCESS
151-63 (2nd ed. 1998).
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parole, can be expected to experience poor health relative to their
cohorts in the free world. This problem escalates dramatically after
they reach the age of fifty, leading to shortened life expectancies and
early deaths. 34 Most of these prisoners die "alone, unmourned, a
disgrace in the person's own eyes as well as in the eyes of society."
35
34. See James W. Marquart, Dorothy E. Merianos & Geri Doucet, The Health Related
Concerns of Older Prisoners: Implications for Policy, 20 AGING & SOCIETY 79, 85 (2000). See
also Seena Fazel et al., Health of Elderly Male Prisoners: Worse than the General Population,
Worse than Younger Prisoners, 30 AGE & AGEING 403, 404-06 (2001), available at
http://ageing.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/30/5/369.pdf.; CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA &
MARGARET E. NOONAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEATHS IN CUSTODY STATISTICAL TABLES 15
(2009), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/dcrp/dcst.pdf; Melonie Heron et al., Deaths:
Final Data for 2006, NAT'L VITAL STATISTICS REP., Apr. 17, 2009, at 1, 22, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr57/nvsr57_14.pdf. (For a six year period (2001-2006),
the annual average rate of illness-related death in state prison rose sharply from thirty per
100,000 for inmates aged twenty-five to thirty-four, to 118 per 100,000 for those aged thirty-
five to forty-four, and then up to 493 deaths per 100,000 for those forty-five to fifty-four and
quadrupling again to 1,987 per 100,000 for those fifty-five and over. The comparable
mortality rate for Americans in the free world for men fifty-five and over is 659.7 per 100,000,
or fully two thirds lower than the prison rate. The older prisoners dying in prison today are not
primarily prisoners serving LWOP, but these mortality figures suggest that this is the death
rate those prisoners will likely experience as they age.); Brie Williams & Rita Abraldes,
Growing Older: Challenges of Prison and Reentry for the Aging Population, in PUBLIC
HEALTH BEHIND BARS: FROM PRISONS TO COMMUNITIES 56, 56, 58-59, 61-64 (Robert
Greifinger ed., 2007). Although prisoners have complicated health histories and the delivery
of health care services in prison is an immensely challenging undertaking, these statistics are
nevertheless troubling.
35. Johnson, supra note 10, at 344. See also RONALD H. ADAY, AGING PRISONERS:
CRISIS IN AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 128 (2003); John Corley, Life in Four Parts: A Memoir, in
EXILED VOICES: PORTALS OF DISCOVERY - STORIES, POEMS, AND DRAMA BY IMPRISONED
INMATES 41, 53-54 (Susan Nagelsen ed., 2008). Anecdotal evidence on untimely and
undignified deaths in prisons can be quite compelling. Describing the frequency of death in
Angola prison in a recent seven-year period, LWOP inmate John Conley observed the
following: "196 prisoners died in Angola, an average of about 30 per year. Five were killed by
the state, two were killed by other inmates, four killed themselves. The 185 others, average
age slightly over fifty, died of a variety of ailments and diseases. Seven were thirty or
younger; the youngest was nineteen. Nineteen were over seventy, the oldest eighty-three." The
grim circumstances of these deaths were described as follows: "They died from the
recklessness and deprivation of their pasts, the drugs and booze, the poverty leading to
undiagnosed health conditions. They died because years of continuous incarceration sucked
the very life from them, slowly, a day at a time, a torment worse than an inquisitional
persecution. They died in dark rooms behind locked doors calling for their mamas." Id. at 53.
See also Marilyn Buck, Dear Liz, 30 FEMINIST STUD. 274 (2004). The horrors of a death in
prison are the subject of prisoner poetry, including a poem by Marilyn Buck, an LWOP inmate
(a "lifer"), called "Dear Liz": "we talked of death / there was no one else who would / talk of
death makes people nervous / tongues stutter / we are all dying every day / you told me you
wanted to scream / you're not dying / like I'm dying / alien forms feed on my flesh / they are
nearly finished." See also Marilyn Buck, Not a Life Sentence, 30 FEMINIST STUD. 276 (2004).
Buck's "Not a Life Sentence" is about a woman serving a short term who dies before her
sentence ends due to poor medical care, a chronic complaint of prisoners: "only a few years to
do / the prisoner's health crumbles / their complaints callously dismissed / shut up in
correction's closets / only a year left to do / the prisoner dies." Id. Often, prisoners are
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In cases of death by incarceration as well as death by execution, death
is the intended and expected outcome of the sentence. With both
sanctions, death is untimely because it is hastened by the actions of the
state. These deaths are also undignified, occurring with the stigma of
dying in the intrinsically degrading conditions of America's maximum
security prisons.36
Death by incarceration is a death sentence and should therefore
be reserved, alongside death by execution, for the worst offenders.
Today, as a practical matter, we restrict death by execution to adults
convicted of capital murder.37 If we maintain this restriction with
sentences of death by incarceration, we would achieve retributive
justice: culpable adult capital murderers would give their civil
lives-permanently forfeiting their freedom-in return for the natural
lives they have taken.38 Any other application of the sentence of death
by incarceration would be unjustified; the punishment would be
excessive and therefore disproportionate to the crime committed. By
this reckoning, we argue that death by incarceration should be reserved
for the crime of capital murder committed by an adult offender, subject
to the procedural safeguards attendant to capital trials.39 Much of the
Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence is premised on the notion
that "death is different," meaning that death is uniquely final,
40irrevocable, and severe. It is our contention that death by execution is
different from other sanctions in essentially the same way that death
by incarceration is different from other sanctions.
demonized even in death, dying in shackles, in isolation from even the few friends they may
have made in prison. See Margeret Ratcliff, Dying Inside the Walls, 3 J. PALLIATIVE MED.
509, 509-11 (2000). See also ERIN GEORGE, A WOMAN DOING LIFE (forthcoming 2010).
36. See Robert Johnson, Life Under Sentence of Death: Historical and Contemporary
Perspectives, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 647, 661-65 (James R. Acker
et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003); VICTOR HASSINE, LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: LIVING IN PRISON TODAY
184-86, 193-94, 222 (quoting Robert Johnson & Ania Dobrzanska eds., Oxford Univ. Press
4th ed. 2009) (1996).
37. See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, DEATH PENALTY FOR OFFENSES OTHER
THAN MURDER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-offenses-other-murder (last
visited Dec. 27, 2009). There are capital crimes on the books other than murder, but no one
has been executed for a crime other than murder since the reinstatement of the modem death
penalty in 1976. Id.
38. See Robert Johnson, A Life for a Life?, 1 JUST. Q. 569, 577-78 (1984); see also
JOHNSON, supra note 33, at 242-43.
39. See Johnson, supra note 10, at 344; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188
(1975); Hugo Adam Bedau, Death is Different: Studies, in THE MORALITY, LAW AND POLITICS
OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 4 (1987).
40. See also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188; Bedau, supra note 39, at 4.
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For our purposes here, it is clear that the sentence of death by
incarceration should be strictly prohibited for any juvenile crime, no
matter how severe. The Court in Roper offers support for this
proposition: "Retribution is not proportional if the law's most severe
penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is
diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and
immaturity.' '41 Death by incarceration is one of the two most severe
penalties prescribed by the law-each a form of death penalty.
Therefore, based upon the Court's own reasoning in Roper, this
sanction should be prohibited with regard to juvenile offenders.
The sentence of death by incarceration also fails to serve as a
viable deterrent, which was another primary purpose of punishment
considered by the Court in Roper, in the same way that death by
execution fails to serve as a viable deterrent. 42 Life without parole is,
of course, a severe sanction, but the Court made no effort to argue that
juveniles would be deterred by this sanction any more effectively (or
ineffectively) than by a sentence of death. The opposite is likely true,
based upon the reasoning of the Court. Death by incarceration involves
a death in prison that will be, in many cases, even more distant in time,
and hence more abstract and psychologically remote to juveniles than
death by execution.
The Court pointed to the inherent immaturity and impulsivity
of juveniles to explain why they are less culpable for their crimes and
less likely to be deterred by the threat of punishment.43 By the same
token, juveniles are also unlikely to be deterred by the threat of death
by incarceration. Because juveniles are characterized by "an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility, '4 4 they are far less likely to
have performed an intricate cost-benefit analysis-a characteristic of a
mature adult-prior to committing their crime. It is also unlikely that a
juvenile can fully comprehend the absolute nature of a death penalty,
whether by incarceration or by execution. Death by incarceration is a
final and irrevocable sanction that unfolds over years or even decades
in captivity, culminating in an untimely, undignified, and often
41. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).
42. Juveniles have been recognized by the Court as unlikely to employ "the kind of cost-
benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution." Id. at 561-62. The
Court did note that any "residual deterrent effect" of the death penalty was not lost since "the
punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction, in
particular for a young person." Id. at 572.
43. Id. at 569-71.
44. Id. at 569.
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physically painful death due to violence or debilitating illness.45 These
deaths are, in our view, likely more painful and perhaps even less
dignified than deaths by execution. We wonder if the typical adult
offender can fully appreciate the enormity of death by incarceration
and the nature of death in confinement at some unknown but often
distant point in the future. If adult felons are unlikely to fully
comprehend the sentence of death by incarceration, surely it is beyond
a juvenile's comprehension.
As the plurality held in Thompson v. Oklahoma,46 an earlier
Supreme Court case prohibiting the execution of juveniles ages fifteen
and under, the notion of deterrence among juveniles is "so remote as to
be virtually nonexistent., 47 Successful deterrence requires that the
potential offender possess a fully developed and rational mind.
Thompson and, subsequently, Roper, which extended the ban on
executions to all juveniles, demonstrates that the Court has agreed that
juveniles are, by nature, immature in their thoughts and actions, and
hence incapable of grappling with the sorts of concepts and ideas that
would lead to deterrence.48 Thus, deterrence not only fails to provide
an adequate justification for sentencing juveniles to death by
execution, but also fails to provide an adequate justification for
sentencing juveniles to death by incarceration.
III. DEATH BY INCARCERATION FAILS TO PROVIDE JUVENILE
OFFENDERS WITH A CHANCE AT REFORM AND FORGIVENESS
In keeping with the Court's contention in Roper, all juvenile
offenders, no matter how serious their crimes, should be afforded the
possibility of reform. According to Roper, "the signature qualities of
youth are transient: as individuals mature, the impetuousness and
recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside., 49 As a
result, "a greater possibility exists that a minor's character deficiencies
will be reformed., 50
45. Violence (including suicide) and illness (including AIDS) are the main causes of
death in prison. See CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA & MARGARET E. NOONAN, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, DEATHS IN CUSTODY STATISTICAL TABLES 3 (2009), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/dcrp/dcst.pdf.
46. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
47. Roper, 543 U.S. at 572.
48. Id. at 561; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835.
49. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
50. Id.
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A sentence of death by incarceration would preclude reform51
and the possibility to earn forgiveness, which Roper also found true of
death by execution.52 Prisons are not settings of forgiveness. Nor are
they settings in which young persons can mature into responsible,
moral adults. Prisons are monuments to punishment and exclusion, and
the code of life in prison embodies the exact sort of immaturity,
impulsivity, and aggression that the Court in Roper claims that
juveniles may overcome if given suitable punishments.53 Under
present sentencing practices, however, juveniles as young as thirteen
years old, some of them first time offenders, have been sentenced to
death by incarceration.54 To deny juveniles, as a matter of law, any
hope that they may one day escape the moral cesspool that is prison, is
to condemn them to a lifetime of extreme suffering that is ended only
by their deaths. More importantly, to deny them even the opportunity
to be heard by a parole board is to ignore the most basic premise upon
which the Court in Roper ruled: "When a juvenile offender commits a
heinous crime, the State can exact forfeiture of some of the most basic
liberties, but the State cannot extinguish his life and his potential to
attain a mature understanding of his own humanity.,
55
A sentence of death by incarceration extinguishes the
juvenile's life in a free society, condemning him to a mere existence in
the often brutal netherworld of prison. A life relegated to prison, where
emotional immaturity is the norm, effectively extinguishes the
juvenile's "Potential to attain "a mature understanding of his own
humanity." 6 As they age, juveniles serving life without parole can
51. Id. at569-71.
52. Id.
53. See ROBERT JOHNSON, HARD TIME: UNDERSTANDING AND REFORMING THE PRISON
19-20, 135-55 (Wadsworth Publ'g Co. 3rd ed. 2002) (1986). See also VICTOR HASSINE, LIFE
WITHOUT PAROLE: LIVING IN PRISON TODAY 77, 112-14, 148-51,159-64, 195,217-18,223-24
(citing Robert Johnson & Ania Dobrzanska eds., Oxford Univ. Press 4th ed. 2009) (1996).
54. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: SENTENCING 13- AND 14-
YEAR-OLD CHILDREN TO DIE IN PRISON 4 (2008).
55. Roper, 543 U.S. at 573-74 (2005).
56. Id. at 574. See also Johnson, supra note 10, at 340 (2008).
I don't know how I'm going to [make it]. There's a man who lives next
door to me. He's about seventy years old and his crime was multiple
murders back in the sixties. He has been in here ever since... Sometimes I
wonder if and how I'm going to manage living in here that long. I think
when you come to prison you stop developing which is why he is also
very childish. He got arrested at a very young age like me and I wonder. I
think it's pretty obvious that I stopped developing the minute I was
arrested. You don't develop in here. That stops and you are basically stuck
at whatever age you were when you were arrested. So, I see this seventy
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become more emotionally stable within the highly structured routine
of prison life, but they typically do not become more emotionally
mature and autonomous; if anything, lifers become less emotionally
mature and autonomous and more dependent on prison routine to
manage their daily existence.57 They live on the surface of things, by
routine and rote; their lives are superficial, which is why lifers seem
not to mature emotionally as the years pass. They typically get through
each day on "automatic pilot," with little thought or reflection. Prisons
can be compared to a deep freeze in the sense that personal
autonomy-the capacity for mature self-management-stops at the
point of entry into prison.
If one needed a good working definition of cruel punishment, it
would be a lifetime of extreme suffering that commences when the
offender is a child, unformed in character and susceptible to
environmental pressures pushing him toward a future that is beyond
his comprehension, let alone his control. Can anyone seriously
contend-or better, provide evidence-that a juvenile has any
meaningful understanding of a sentence to prison for the remainder of
his life? Given the coping deficiencies common to children, together
with the inordinately long sentences that stretch out before them, a
sentence of death by incarceration is a sanction more cruel even than
death by execution. Death by execution at least offers an end to the
offender's suffering within a decade or so, and can be legally
accelerated if the prisoner drops his appeals and submits to
execution.' By contrast, many lifers and other prisoners are confined
year old man with the mentally [sic] of a twenty-three year old and I was
arrested when I was nineteen. Id.
57. Robert Johnson & Ania Dobrzanska, Mature Coping Among Life-Sentence
Prisoners: An Exploratory Study of Adjustment Dynamics, 30(6) CORRECTIONS COMPENDIUM
8-9, 36-38 (2005). See also Johnson supra note 10 at 342. LWOP inmates and other long-
term inmates often cope better-and in a narrow sense, more maturely-with the stresses of
prison life than they did with the stresses of life in the free world, though the younger the
prisoner is when he starts his term, the more difficult the subsequent adjustment. See also
VICTORIA R. DEROSIA, LIVING INSIDE PRISON WALLS: ADJUSTMENT BEHAVIOR 29, 39-40
(1998).
58. See Elizabeth Cepparulo, Roper v. Simmons: Unveiling Juvenile Purgatory: Is Life
Really Better than Death? 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 225, 248-49 (2006); ROBERT
JOHNSON, LIFE UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES,
IN AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT,
AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 647 (James R. Acker, Robert M. Bohm &
Charles S. Lanier eds., 2nd ed. 2003). Death row confinement can offer comparable stresses,
but the duration of death row confinement, on average, is much shorter than the period of time
in confinement served by LWOP inmates ("lifers"). See also John H. Blume, Killing the
Willing: "Volunteers, " Suicide and Competency, 103 MICH. L. REV. 939, 939-40, 951-52
(2005); Craig Haney, A Culture of Harm: Taming the Dynamics of Cruelty in Supermax
Prisons, 35 CRIM. JUST. AND BEHAV. 956, 962 (2008); Terry A. Kupers, What To Do With the
JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE
in modem prisons in what amounts to long-term solitary confinement,
and go long periods without access to radio, television, or the company
of others. The law provides no escape for them. Psychological research
suggests that the mental life of the long-term prisoner in maximum,
and especially supermaximum, incarceration is a tumultuous and
precarious one, and one marked b € acute suffering, even agony, that
must seem endless to the prisoner.
Moreover, the punishment of death-the execution
itself-especially using lethal injection, is quick and may even be
physically painless, particularly compared to the agony often
associated with the deaths suffered by lifers, who die from traumatic
violent attack, suicide, or chronic and often debilitating illness. And
even if execution is physically painful, the pain of execution lasts
minutes, not days, months, or years, as is typically the case with deaths
due to illness, a main cause of death among lifers.60 It is clear, then,
that the suffering of prisoners condemned to death row is no more
intense than that of prisoners relegated to long-term solitary
confinement or even regular maximum-security confinement for the
remainder of their lives. For juveniles, the remainder of their lives can
extend for sixty, seventy, or even eighty years, which makes a
sentence of death by incarceration a remarkably severe and invasive
sanction.
In the words of one juvenile prisoner sentenced to death by
incarceration, "I wish I still had the death sentence... Really, death
has never been my fear. What do people believe? That being alive in
prison is a good life? This is slavery."1 The slavery reference, though
unsettling, may be apt. The profound arbitrariness of sentencing
juveniles to death by incarceration is magnified by the racially biased
way in which this death penalty is administered. Black juvenile
Survivors? Coping With the Long-Term Effects of Isolated Confinement, 35 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 1005, 1014 (2008); Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement on
Prison Inmates: A Brief History and Review of the Literature, 34 CRIME AND JUST. 441, 476-
88 (2006). See generally David Lovell, Patterns of Disturbed Behavior in a Supermax
Population, 35 CRIM. JUST. AND BEHAV. 985 (2008).
59. Haney, supra note 58, at 956 and accompanying text (citing Craig Haney, Mental
Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and "Supermax" Confinement, 49 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 124 (2003)).
60. Christopher J. Mumola, MEDICAL CAUSES OF DEATH IN STATE PRISONS, 2001-2004,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE DATA BRIEF, available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mcdsp04.pdf.
61. Cepparulo, supra note 58, at 225.
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offenders receive the sentence of death by incarceration as much ten
times more than white juvenile offenders.62
Arbitrary and extreme suffering virtually eliminates any
possibility that a juvenile can improve himself and mature as a human
being. Meaningful, positive change is only possible if juvenile
offenders have some hope that they may one day return to society. The
opportunity to be considered by a parole board gives juveniles a reason
to strive to grow and show that they are worthy of another chance at
life in the free world. For some juvenile offenders, release may never
materialize. No one is guaranteed forgiveness and second chances
must be earned. As a practical matter, lifers with parole eligibility
typically are released at a very low rate-as low as .01 or .02 percent
per year in California.63 But hope is kept alive by the promise that a
62. See Letter from David C. Fathi, Director, US Program, Human Rights Watch, to the
Secretary of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (Feb. 26, 2008),
available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/02/26/united-states-was-not-forthcoming-and-
accurate-its-presentation-cerd ("Among the 2,381 US prisoners currently serving LWOP for
crimes they committed as children, there are staggering racial disparities, with black youth
serving LWOP at a per capita rate ten times higher than white youth."); Letter from Human
Rights Organizations to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (Jun. 4,
2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/06/04/letter-human-rights-
organizations-cerd-regarding-juvenile-life-without-parole-us.
63. See Alexander Cockburn, Dead Souls, THE NATION, May 4, 2009, at 9 (stating that
[t]he focus on LWOP tends to blur the fact that it is very hard for lifers not
doing LWOP to get out on parole. Scott Handleman, an attorney in San
Francisco who has spent much time representing prisoners in parole cases,
has been helpful with the chastening data. In California last year, 31,051
prisoners were serving sentences of life with the possibility of parole. Of
those, 8,815 have passed their "minimum eligible parole date," meaning
they have served long enough to be receiving parole hearings. Of those,
6,272 had hearings on the Board of Parole's calendar last year. (Some
prisoners serving beyond their minimum eligible parole date do not get
hearings in a given year because they were denied for multiple years in a
prior hearing.) Only 272 lifers were found suitable for parole by the board
in 2008.
Moreover, the board's decisions in these 272 cases were subject to
Governor Schwarzenegger's review. The California governor has the
power, in murder cases, to reverse the board's ruling and take away the
parole date. For other life-sentence crimes, he can order the board to
reconsider its decision. So only a fraction of those whose parole cases got
reviewed were actually released to the streets. In 2007 the board found
172 lifers suitable for parole; Governor Schwarzenegger reversed 115 of
those decisions, referred eighteen back to the board for reconsideration,
modified two and let stand only thirty-seven. That means in 2007
somewhere between thirty-seven and fifty-seven life-term prisoners got
out of prison in the whole state of California. Out of the roughly 30,000
prisoners who were serving sentences of life with the possibility of parole
in 2007, somewhere around 0.1 percent to 0.2 percent of these prisoners
were released... [R]elease for lifers is a rare phenomenon.).
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person will at some point get a parole hearing-an opportunity to be
heard, re-evaluated, and possibly granted a second chance at normal
life. Hope, in turn, gives young offenders a reason to resist the
destructive forces at work in prison and to prepare for a future in the
free world.64
IV. DEATH BY INCARCERATION IS THE PRIMARY PUNISHMENT IMPOSED
ON ADULT CAPITAL MURDERERS, EVIDENCE THAT IT IS A CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS
The Court in Roper barred the execution of juveniles, in part,
because executions were seen to violate "evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" 65 and, thus,
were cruel and unusual punishment. The Court used the behavior of
state legislatures as the measure of current standards of decency
because legislatures presumably pass laws that reflect the current
standards of decency of the American people. In Roper, the Court
considered evidence that several state legislatures had recently passed
laws that prohibited the execution of juveniles, 66 that no legislature has
passed laws in recent years that allowed the execution of juveniles, and
that the practice of actually executing juveniles was increasingly
rare. 67 In other words, death by execution was alive and well with
adult offenders, but was falling into disuse with juvenile offenders.
The Court in Roper also noted that Western countries that share our
democratic values had long ago banned the execution of juveniles, 68
and concluded that the actions of the state legislatures, perhaps
buttressed by international trends,6 9 indicated that our "evolving
standards of decency" prohibit the execution of juveniles as a matter of
64. See JOHN IRWIN, LIFERS: SEEKING REDEMPTION IN PRISON, 90-93, 101-02, 104
(2009). The hope that they might atone for their crimes, redeem themselves, and once again
live free appears to be a driving force in the adjustment of some and perhaps many lifers as
they age behind bars.
65. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005).
66. Id. at 559-60 (citing State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo.
2003) (en banc)).
67. Id. at 567.
68. Id. at 578 ("It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of
international opinion against the juvenile death penalty..."). See id. at 575 (It is noted
explicitly that the "juvenile death penalty" has been abolished "by other nations that share our
Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western European
community...").
69. Id. at 575 ("Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate punishment
for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United States is the only
country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.").
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constitutional law.70 Juvenile offenders, the Court maintained, were
"categorically less culpable than the average criminal.",71 As a result,
no matter how egregious the crime, 72 the execution of a juvenile
offender would be excessive and hence would violate the Eighth
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
Western countries that share our democratic values and
prohibit the execution of juveniles have also abolished the use of
executions with adults. 73 Since there is no substantial trend toward
general abolition in the United States, this international trend toward
abolition, standing alone, seems to have no bearing on the Supreme
Court's capital punishment jurisprudence.74 However, we suggest that
"evolving standards of decency," as they apply to the death penalty
with adults, may be seen today in America's capital juries.
Increasingly, capital juries are foregoing death by execution in favor of
life without parole.7 It is a matter of record that, in many such cases,
life without parole is expressly described by defense attorneys and
even judges as a form of death penalty, namely, death by
incarceration.76
70. The Court opined that "[t]he death penalty may not be imposed on certain classes of
offenders, such as juveniles under 16, the insane, and the mentally retarded, no matter how
heinous the crime" (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399 (1986); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)). Id. at 568. According to the
Roper Court, "[t]hese rules vindicate the underlying principle that the death penalty is reserved
for a narrow category of crimes and offenders." Id. at 568-69. In Roper, this narrow category
was construed to include all juveniles because of their distinctive immaturity, consequently
excluding them from death by execution sentences. See id. at 564-70.
71. Id. at 567.
72. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 556-57. The crime in Roper was grievous by any standard,
so the Court has clearly determined that the persons in the category "juvenile offender" can
commit heinous offenses for which they are never fully culpable. The prosecutor in the Roper
case indicated that the crime "involved depravity of mind and was outrageously and wantonly
vile, horrible, and inhuman." Id. at 557. The facts of the case, as summarized in the Roper
holding, pointed to a calculated, cold-blooded, and indeed wanton infliction of violence on a
bound, gagged, and utterly helpless older woman. Id. at 556-57.
73. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS IN 2008, at 5, 8,
17 (2009), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT50/003/2009/eni/Ob789cbl 
-baa8-4c lb-bc35-
58b606309836/act500032009en.pdf ("Europe and Central Asia is now virtually a death
penalty free zone following the abolition of the death penalty in Uzbekistan for all crimes.
There is just one country left-Belarus-that still carries out executions."). In addition, the
United States is the primary source of executions in the Americas. The only countries that
execute more than the United States are China, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Id.
74. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 577-78.
75. See supra, note 17.
76. See Lisa Rogers, Judge to Holladay: 'You Get to Come Out of Prison in a Pine
Box,' GADSDEN TIMES (Alabama), Jun. 26, 2009, available at
http://www.gadsdentimes.com/article/20090626/NEWS/906269983/- 1/NEWS04?Title=Judge-
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The declining rates of traditional death sentences (death by
execution) in capital cases imply that death by incarceration is
becoming our main death penalty and consequently the sentence we
are using to punish what we have deemed to be the worst offenders:
adult capital murderers. This trend alone suggests that death by
incarceration is an excessive sanction for other adult offenders whose
offenses are less serious than capital murder. And by this same logic,
death by incarceration is clearly an excessive sanction for any juvenile
offender, since no juvenile offender is sufficiently culpablc to be
punished in the same way as an adult capital murderer. If Roper stands
for anything, it is that some punishments are acceptable for adults but
not children. Surely, the sanction of choice for the worst adult
offenders is, by definition, inappropriate for juveniles, regardless of
the nature of their crimes. No Western society executes juveniles.77
Furthermore, no society in the world-not merely in the
West-subjects juveniles to sentences of death by incarceration. 78
V. CONCLUSION
The Court in Roper held that juveniles cannot and should not
be subjected to death by execution because of their inherently
immature and underdeveloped characters. Juveniles are less culpable
for their crimes and more amenable to change under the appropriate
to-Holladay-You-get-to-come-out-of-prison-in-a-pine-box- ("I can impose death by
incarceration in the sentence of life without the possibility of parole," [Federal Judge Milligan]
told [defendant] Holladay, as Holladay stood shackled and chained in an orange and white
striped uniform from the Etowah County jail. "You get to come out of prison in a pine box.").
Id.
77. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ENFORCING THE INTERNATIONAL PROHIBITION ON THE
JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY 1-2 (2008),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related-material/HRW.Juv.Death.Penalty.053008.pdf.
The prohibition on the death penalty for crimes committed by juvenile
offenders-persons under age 18 at the time of the offence-is well
established in international treaty and customary law. The overwhelming
majority of states comply with this standard: only five states are known to
have executed juvenile offenders since 2005... the five states known to
have executed juvenile offenders since 2005: Iran (16 executions), Saudi
Arabia (3 executions), Sudan (2 executions), Yemen (1 execution), and
Pakistan (1 execution). Id.
78. See Letter to the Secretary of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (Feb. 26, 2008), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/02/26/united-states-was-
not-forthcoming-and-accurate-its-presentation-cerd. Human Rights Watch reports that "The
United States is the only country in the world that sentences children (persons under the age of
18) to life in prison without possibility of parole or release (known as life without parole, or
LWOP)." Id. See also Constance De la Vega & Michelle T. Leighton, Sentencing Our
Children to Die in Prison: Global Law and Practice 42 U.S.F. L. REv. 983, 985 (2008).
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circumstances. 79 According to the Court, evolving standards of
decency, as evidenced by the behavior of state legislatures and
international trends, suggest that the American people consider
executing juveniles to be cruel and unusual punishment. Under the
logic of the Roper holding, and mindful of capital sentencing trends
that lend insight into our current standards of decency, we suggest that
death by incarceration, our other death penalty, is also cruel and
unusual punishment when applied to juveniles. The Governor of
Kentucky, quoted approvingly by the Court in Roper, made the simple
and direct observation that "[w]e ought not be executing people who,
legally, were children." 81 Neither should we lock up these children in
adult prisons and throw away the key.
We have two death penalties in America: death by execution
and death by incarceration. Death by incarceration, the sentence given
when a jury or judge imposes a term of life without parole, condemns
the person to die in prison. This is a death sentence, plain and simple.
Like death by execution, death by incarceration is utterly unsuitable
for children no matter how serious the crime. The crime in Roper was
egregious by any standard, and yet the Court held that death by
execution was an excessive punishment because the defendant was a
juvenile. 82 We extend the Court's logic in Roper and argue that death
by incarceration is always an excessive punishment for juveniles as
well. Even the worst juvenile offender deserves a sentence that offers
the possibility of release back into the free world and a second chance
at life.
79. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-71. To recognize the immature and unformed character
of juveniles, as the Court in Roper has done, is to implicitly acknowledge that juveniles have a
claim to social conditions, such as nurturance and education, which foster their mature
development. To sentence juveniles to death-by execution or incarceration-is to completely
disown those children, and hence to abrogate the responsibility we as a society must bear in
their development.
80. See Roper, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
81. Roper, 543 U.S. at 565.
82. Id. at 556-57.
